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Abstract: Much is now known about the consistency of Bayesian updat-
ing on infinite-dimensional parameter spaces with independent or Marko-
vian data. Necessary conditions for consistency include the prior putting
enough weight on the correct neighborhoods of the data-generating distri-
bution; various sufficient conditions further restrict the prior in ways analo-
gous to capacity control in frequentist nonparametrics. The asymptotics of
Bayesian updating with mis-specified models or priors, or non-Markovian
data, are far less well explored. Here I establish sufficient conditions for
posterior convergence when all hypotheses are wrong, and the data have
complex dependencies. The main dynamical assumption is the asymptotic
equipartition (Shannon-McMillan-Breiman) property of information the-
ory. This, along with Egorov’s Theorem on uniform convergence, lets me
build a sieve-like structure for the prior. The main statistical assumption,
also a form of capacity control, concerns the compatibility of the prior
and the data-generating process, controlling the fluctuations in the log-
likelihood when averaged over the sieve-like sets. In addition to posterior
convergence, I derive a kind of large deviations principle for the posterior
measure, extending in some cases to rates of convergence, and discuss the
advantages of predicting using a combination of models known to be wrong.
An appendix sketches connections between these results and the replicator
dynamics of evolutionary theory.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: Primary 62C10, 62G20, 62M09; sec-
ondary 60F10, 62M05, 92D15, 94A17.
Keywords and phrases: asymptotic equipartition, Bayesian consistency,
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1. Introduction
The problem of the convergence and frequentist consistency of Bayesian learning
goes as follows. We encounter observations X1, X2, . . ., which we would like to
predict by means of a family Θ of models or hypotheses (indexed by θ). We
begin with a prior probability distribution Π0 over Θ, and update this using
Bayes’s rule, so that our distribution after seeing X1, X2, . . . Xt ≡ Xt1 is Πt.
If the observations come from a stochastic process with infinite-dimensional
distribution P , when does Πt converge P -almost surely? What is the rate of
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convergence? Under what conditions will Bayesian learning be consistent, so
that Πt doesn’t just converge but its limit is P?
Since the Bayesian estimate is really the whole posterior probability distri-
bution Πt rather than a point or set in Θ, consistency becomes concentration
of Πt around P . One defines some sufficiently strong set of neighborhoods of P
in the space of probability distributions on X∞1 , and says that Πt is consistent
when, for each such neighborhood N , limt→∞ΠtN = 1. When this holds, the
posterior increasingly approximates a degenerate distribution centered at the
truth.
The greatest importance of these problems, perhaps, is their bearing on the
objectivity and reliability of Bayesian inference; consistency proofs and conver-
gence rates are, as it were, frequentist licenses for Bayesian practices. Moreover,
if Bayesian learners starting from different priors converge rapidly on the same
posterior distribution, there is less reason to worry about the subjective or ar-
bitrary element in the choice of priors. (Such “merger of opinion” results [7]
are also important in economics and game theory [11].) Recent years have seen
considerable work on these problems, especially in the non-parametric setting
where the model space Θ is infinite-dimensional [30].
Pioneering work by Doob [19], using elegant martingale arguments, estab-
lished that when any consistent estimator exists, and P lies in the support of
Π0, the set of sample paths on which the Bayesian learner fails to converge to
the truth has prior probability zero. (See [13] and [42] for extensions of this
result to non-IID settings, and also the discussion in [55; 21].) This is not, how-
ever, totally reassuring, since P generally also has prior probability zero, and it
would be unfortunate if these two measure-zero sets should happen to coincide.
Indeed, Diaconis and Freedman established that the consistency of Bayesian
inference depends crucially on the choice of prior, and that even very natural
priors can lead to inconsistency (see [18] and references therein).
Subsequent work, following a path established by Schwartz [56], has shown
that, no matter what the true data-generating distribution P , Bayesian updat-
ing converges along P -almost-all sample paths, provided that (a) P is contained
in Θ, (b) every Kullback-Leibler neighborhood in the Θ has some positive prior
probability (the “Kullback-Leibler property”), and (c) certain restrictions hold
on the prior, amounting to versions of capacity control, as in the method of
sieves or structural risk minimization. These contributions also make (d) cer-
tain dynamical assumptions about the data-generating process, most often that
it is IID [4; 26; 65] (in this setting, [27] and [59] in particular consider conver-
gence rates), independent non-identically distributed [13; 29], or, in some cases,
Markovian [28; 29]; [14] and [52] work with spectral density estimation and
sequential analysis, respectively, again exploiting specific dynamical properties.
For mis-specified models, that is settings where (a) above fails, important
early results were obtained by Berk [5; 6] for IID data, albeit under rather
strong restrictions on likelihood functions and parameter spaces, showing that
the posterior distribution concentrates on an “asymptotic carrier”, consisting of
the hypotheses which are the best available approximations, in the Kullback-
Leibler sense, to P within the support of the prior. More recently, [38], [68] and
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[41] have dealt with the convergence of non-parametric Bayesian estimation for
IID data when P is not in the support of the prior, obtaining results similar
to Berk’s in far more general settings, extending in some situations to rates of
convergence. All of this work, however, relies on the dynamical assumption of
an IID data-source.
This paper gives sufficient conditions for the convergence of the posterior
without assuming (a), and substantially weakening (c) and (d). Even if one uses
non-parametric models, cases where one knows that the true data generating
process is exactly represented by one of the hypotheses in the model class are
scarce. Moreover, while IID data can be produced, with some trouble and ex-
pense, in the laboratory or in a well-conducted survey, in many applications
the data are not just heterogeneous and dependent, but their heterogeneity and
dependence is precisely what is of interest. This raises the question of what
Bayesian updating does when the truth is not contained in the support of the
prior, and observations have complicated dependencies.
To answer this question, I first weaken the dynamical assumptions to the
asymptotic equipartition property (Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem) of in-
formation theory, i.e., for each hypothesis θ, the log-likelihood per unit time con-
verges almost surely. This log-likelihood per unit time is basically the growth
rate of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between P and θ, h(θ). As observa-
tions accumulate, areas of Θ where h(θ) exceeds its essential infimum h(Θ) tend
to lose posterior probability, which concentrates in divergence-minimizing re-
gions. Some additional conditions on the prior distribution are needed to prevent
it from putting too much weight initially on hypotheses with high divergence
rates but slow convergence of the log-likelihood. As the latter assumptions are
strengthened, more and more can be said about the convergence of the posterior.
Using the weakest set of conditions (Assumptions 1–3), the long-run expo-
nential growth rate of the posterior density at θ cannot exceed h(Θ) − h(θ)
(Theorem 1). Adding Assumptions 4–6 to provide better control over the inte-
grated or marginal likelihood establishes (Theorem 2) that the long-run growth
rate of the posterior density is in fact h(Θ) − h(θ). One more assumption (7)
then lets us conclude (Theorem 3) that the posterior distribution converges, in
the sense that, for any set of hypotheses A, the posterior probability Πt(A)→ 0
unless the essential infimum of h(θ) over A equals h(Θ). In fact, we then have a
kind of large deviations principle for the posterior measure (Theorem 4), as well
as a bound on the generalization ability of the posterior predictive distribution
(Theorem 5). Convergence rates for the posterior (Theorem 6) follow from the
combination of the large deviations result with an extra condition related to
assumption 6. Importantly, Assumptions 4–7, and so the results following from
them, involve both the prior distribution and the data-generating process, and
require the former to be adapted to the latter. Under mis-specification, it does
not seem to be possible to guarantee posterior convergence by conditions on the
prior alone, at least not with the techniques used here.
For the convenience of reader, the development uses the usual statistical vo-
cabulary and machinery. In addition to the asymptotic equipartition property,
the main technical tools are on the one hand Egorov’s theorem from basic mea-
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sure theory, which is used to construct a sieve-like sequence of sets on which
log-likelihood ratios converge uniformly, and on the other hand Assumption 6
bounding how long averages over these sets can remain far from their long-
run limits. The latter assumption is crucial, novel, and, in its present form,
awkward to check; I take up its relation to more familiar assumptions in the
discussion. It may be of interest, however, that the results were first found via an
apparently-novel analogy between Bayesian updating and the “replicator equa-
tion” of evolutionary dynamics, which is a formalization of the Darwinian idea
of natural selection. Individual hypotheses play the role of distinct replicators
in a population, the posterior distribution being the population distribution
over replicators and fitness being proportional to likelihood. Appendix A gives
details.
2. Preliminaries and Notation
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and X1, X2, . . ., for short X∞1 , be a se-
quence of random variables, taking values in the measurable space (Ξ,X ), whose
infinite-dimensional distribution is P . The natural filtration of this process is
σ (Xt1). The only dynamical properties are those required for the Shannon-
McMillan-Breiman theorem (Assumption 3); more specific assumptions such
as P being a product measure, Markovian, exchangeable, etc., are not required.
Unless otherwise noted, all probabilities are taken with respect to P , and E [·]
always means expectation under that distribution.
Statistical hypotheses, i.e., distributions of processes adapted to σ (Xt1), are
denoted by Fθ, the index θ taking values in the hypothesis space, a measurable
space (Θ, T ), generally infinite-dimensional. For convenience, assume that P
and all the Fθ are dominated by a common reference measure, with respective
densities p and fθ. I do not assume that P ∈ Θ, still less that P ∈ supp Π0 —
i.e., quite possibly all of the available hypotheses are false.
We will study the evolution of a sequence of probability measures Πt on
(Θ, T ), starting with a non-random prior measure Π0. (A filtration on Θ is
not needed; the measures Πt change but not the σ-field T .) Assume all Πt
are absolutely continuous with respect to a common reference measure, with
densities pit. Expectations with respect to these measures will be written either
as explicit integrals or de Finetti style, Πt (f) =
∫
f(θ)dΠt(θ); when A is a set,
Πt (fA) = Πt (f1A) =
∫
A
f(θ)dΠt(θ).
Let Lt(θ) be the conditional likelihood of xt under θ, i.e., Lt(θ) ≡ fθ(Xt =
xt|Xt−11 = xt−11 ), with L0 = 1. The integrated conditional likelihood is Πt (Lt).
Bayesian updating of course means that, for any A ∈ T ,
Πt+1 (A) =
Πt (Lt+1A)
Πt (Lt+1)
or, in terms of the density,
pit+1(θ) =
Lt+1(θ)pit(θ)
Πt (Lt+1)
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It will also be convenient to express Bayesian updating in terms of the prior
and the total likelihood:
Πt (A) =
∫
A
dΠ0(θ)fθ(xt1)∫
Θ
dΠ0(θ)fθ(xt1)
=
∫
A
dΠ0(θ)
fθ(x
t
1)
p(xt1)∫
Θ
dΠ0(θ)
fθ(xt1)
p(xt1)
=
Π0 (RtA)
Π0 (Rt)
where Rt(θ) ≡ fθ(x
t
1)
p(xt1)
is the ratio of model likelihood to true likelihood. (Note
that 0 < p(xt1) <∞ for all t P -a.s.) Similarly,
pit(θ) = pi0(θ)
Rt(θ)
Π0 (Rt)
The one-step-ahead predictive distribution of the hypothesis θ is given by
Fθ
(
Xt|σ
(
Xt−11
))
, with the convention that t = 1 gives the marginal distri-
bution of the first observation. Abbreviate this by F tθ . Similarly, let P
t ≡
P
(
Xt|σ
(
Xt−11
))
; this is the best probabilistic prediction we could make, did
we but know P [39]. The posterior predictive distribution is given by mixing
the individual predictive distributions with weights given by the posterior:
F tΠ ≡
∫
Θ
F tθdΠt(θ)
Remark on the topology of Θ and on T The hope in studying posterior
convergence is to show that, as t grows, with higher and higher (P ) probability,
Πt concentrates more and more on sets which come closer and closer to P . The
tricky part here is “closer and closer”: points in Θ represent infinite-dimensional
stochastic process distributions, and the topology of such spaces is somewhat
odd, and irritatingly abrupt, at least under the more common distances. Any
two ergodic measures are either equal or have completely disjoint supports [31],
so that the Kullback-Leibler divergence between distinct ergodic processes is
always infinity (in both directions), and the total variation and Hellinger dis-
tances are likewise maximal. Most previous work on posterior consistency has
restricted itself to models where the infinite-dimensional process distributions
are formed by products of fixed-dimensional base distributions (IID, Markov,
etc.), and in effect transferred the usual metrics’ topologies from these finite-
dimensional distributions to the processes. It is possible to define metrics for
general stochastic processes [31], and if readers like they may imagine that T
is a Borel σ-field under some such metric. This is not necessary for the results
presented here, however.
2.1. Example
The following example will be used to illustrate the assumptions (§2.2.1 and
Appendix B), and, later, the conclusions (§3.6).
The data-generating process P is a stationary and ergodic measure on the
space of binary sequences, i.e., Ξ = {0, 1}, and the σ-field X = 2Ξ. The measure
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p = 1.0 : '1'
p = 0.5 : '1'
p = 0.5 : '0'
Fig 1. State-transition diagram for the “even process”. The legends on the transition arrows
indicate the probability of making the transition, and the observation which occurs when the
transition happens. The observation Xt = 1 when entering or leaving state 1, otherwise it is
0. This creates blocks of 1s of even length, separated by blocks of 0s of arbitrary length. The
result is a finite-state process which is not a Markov chain of any order.
is naturally represented as a function of a two-state Markov chain S∞1 , with
St ∈ {1, 2}. The transition matrix is
T =
[
0.0 1.0
0.5 0.5
]
so that the invariant distribution puts probability 1/3 on state 1 and probability
2/3 on state 2; take S1 to be distributed accordingly. The observed process is
a binary function of the latent state transitions, Xt = 0 if St = St+1 = 2 and
Xt = 1 otherwise. Figure 1 depicts the transition and observation structure.
Qualitatively, X∞1 consists of blocks of 1s of even length, separated by blocks of
0s of arbitrary length. Since the joint process {(St, Xt)}1≤t≤∞ is a stationary
and ergodic Markov chain, X∞1 is also stationary, ergodic and mixing.
This stochastic process comes from symbolic dynamics [43; 37], where it is
known as the “even process”, and serves as a basic example of the class of sofic
processes [66], which have finite Markovian representations, as in Figure 1, but
are not Markov at any finite order. (If Xt = 1, Xt−1 = 1, . . . Xt−k = 1 for any
finite k, the corresponding St−i must have alternated between one and two,
but whether St is one or two, and thus the distribution of Xt+1, cannot be
determined from the length-k history alone.) More exactly [36], sofic systems or
“finitary measures” are ones which are images of Markov chains under factor
maps, and strictly sofic systems, such as the even process, are sofic systems
which are not themselves Markov chains of any order. Despite their simplicity,
these models arise naturally when studying the time series of chaotic dynamical
systems [3; 15; 57; 16], as well as problems in statistical mechanics [50] and
crystallography [62].
Let Θk be the space of all binary Markov chains of order k with strictly pos-
itive transition probabilities and their respective stationary distributions; each
Θk has dimension 2k. (Allowing some transition probabilities to be zero cre-
ates uninteresting technical difficulties.) Since each hypothesis is equivalent to
a function Ξk+1 7→ (0, 1], we can give Θk the topology of pointwise convergence
of functions, and the corresponding Borel σ-field. We will take Θ =
⋃∞
k=1 Θk,
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identifying Θk with the appropriate subset of Θk+1. Thus Θ consists of all
strictly-positive stationary binary Markov chains, of whatever order, and is
infinite-dimensional.
As for the prior Π0, it will be specified in more detail below (§2.2.1). At
the very least, however, it needs to have the “Kullback-Leibler rate property”,
i.e., to give positive probability to every  “neighborhood” N(θ) around every
θ ∈ Θ, i.e., the set of hypotheses whose Kullback-Leibler divergence from θ
grows no faster than :
N(θ) =
{
θ′ :  ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
∫
dxt1fθ(x
t
1) log
fθ(xt1)
fθ′(xt1)
}
(The limit exists for all θ, θ′ combinations [32].)
This example is simple, but it is also beyond the scope of existing work on
Bayesian convergence in several ways. First, the data-generating process P is
not even Markov. Second, P 6∈ Θ, so all the hypotheses are wrong, and the truth
is certainly not in the support of the prior. (P can however be approximated
arbitrarily closely, in various process metrics, by distributions from Θ.) Third,
because P is ergodic, and ergodic distributions are extreme points in the space
of stationary distributions [20], it cannot be represented as a mixture of dis-
tributions in Θ. This means that the Doob-style theorem of Ref. [42] does not
apply, and even the subjective certainty of convergence is not assured. The re-
sults of Refs. [38; 68; 5; 6] on mis-specified models do not hold because the data
are dependent. To be as concrete and explicit as possible, the analysis here will
focus on the even process, but only the constants would change if P were any
other strictly sofic process. Much of it would apply even if P were a stochastic
context-free language or pushdown automaton [12], where in effect the number
of hidden states is infinite, though some of the details in Appendix B would
change.
Ref. [47] describes a non-parametric procedure which will adaptively learn to
predict a class of discrete stochastic processes which includes the even process.
Ref. [58] introduces a frequentist algorithm which consistently reconstructs the
hidden-state representation of sofic processes, including the even process. Ref.
[61] considers Bayesian estimation of the even process, using Dirichlet priors for
finite-order Markov chains, and employing Bayes factors to decide which order
of chain to use for prediction.
2.2. Assumptions
The needed assumptions have to do with the dynamical properties of the data
generating process P , and with how well the dynamics meshes both with the
class of hypotheses Θ and with the prior distribution Π0 over those hypotheses.
Assumption 1 The likelihood ratio Rt(θ) is σ (Xt1)× T -measurable for all t.
The next two assumptions actually need only hold for Π0-almost-all θ. But
this adds more measure-0 caveats to the results, and it is hard to find a natural
example where it would help.
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Assumption 2 For every θ ∈ Θ, the Kullback-Leibler divergence rate from P ,
h(θ) = lim
t→∞
1
t
E
[
log
p(Xt1)
fθ(Xt1)
]
exists (possibly being infinite) and is T -measurable.
As mentioned, any two distinct ergodic measures are mutually singular, so
there is a consistent test which can separate them. ([53] constructs an explicit
but not necessarily optimal test.) One interpretation of the divergence rate [32]
is that it measures the maximum exponential rate at which the power of such
tests approaches 1, with d = 0 and d =∞ indicating sub- and supra- exponential
convergence, respectively.
Assumption 3 For each θ ∈ Θ, the generalized or relative asymptotic equipar-
tition property holds, and so
lim
1
t
logRt(θ) = −h(θ) (1)
with P -probability 1.
Refs. [1; 32] give sufficient, but not necessary, conditions sufficient for As-
sumption 3 to hold for a given θ. The ordinary, non-relative asymptotic equipar-
tition property, also known as the Shannon-McMillan-Breiman theorem, is that
lim t−1 log p(xt1) = −hP a.s., where hP is the entropy rate of the data-generating
process. (See [32].) If this holds and hP is finite, one could rephrase Assump-
tion 3 as lim t−1 log fθ(Xt1) = −hP − h(θ) a.s., and state results in terms of
the likelihood rather than the likelihood ratio. (Cf. [24, ch. 5].) However, there
are otherwise-well-behaved processes for which hP = −∞, at least in the usual
choice of reference measure, so I will restrict myself to likelihood ratios.
The meaning of Assumption 3 is that, relative to the true distribution, the
likelihood of each θ goes to zero exponentially, the rate being the Kullback-
Leibler divergence rate. Roughly speaking, an integral of exponentially-shrinking
quantities will tend to be dominated by the integrand with the slowest rate of
decay. This suggests that the posterior probability of a set A ⊆ Θ depends on
the smallest divergence rate which can be attained at a point of prior support
within A. Thus, adapting notation from large deviations theory, define
h(A) ≡ ess inf
θ∈A
h(θ)
J(θ) ≡ h(θ)− h(Θ)
J(A) ≡ ess inf
θ∈A
J(θ)
where here and throughout ess inf is the essential infimum with respect to Π0,
i.e., the greatest lower bound which holds with Π0-probability 1.
Our further assumptions are those needed for the “roughly speaking” and
“should” statements of the previous paragraph to be true, so that, for reasonable
sets A ∈ T ,
lim
1
t
log Π0 (RtA) = −h(A)
C. R. Shalizi/Dynamics of Bayesian Updating 9
Let I ≡ {θ : h(θ) =∞}.
Assumption 4 Π0(I) < 1
If this assumption fails, then every hypothesis in the support of the prior
doesn’t just diverge from the true data-generating distribution, it diverges so
rapidly that the error rate of a test against the latter distribution goes to zero
faster than any exponential. (One way this can happen is if every hypothesis
has a finite-dimensional distribution assigning probability zero to some event of
positive P -probability.) The methods of this paper seem to be of no use in the
face of such extreme mis-specification.
Our first substantial assumption is that the prior distribution does not give
too much weight to parts of Θ where the log likelihood converges badly.
Assumption 5 There exists a sequence of sets Gt → Θ such that
1. Π0(Gt) ≥ 1− α exp {−tβ}, for some α > 0, β > 2h(Θ);
2. The convergence of Eq. 1 is uniform in θ over Gt \ I;
3. h(Gt)→ h(Θ).
Comment 1: An analogy with the method of sieves [25] may clarify the mean-
ing of the assumption. If we were constrained to some fixed G, the uniform
convergence in the second part of the assumption would make the convergence
of the posterior distribution fairly straightforward. Now imagine that the con-
straint set is gradually relaxed, so that at time t the posterior is confined to Gt,
which grows so slowly that convergence is preserved. (Assumption 6 below is,
in essence, about the relaxation being sufficiently slow.) The theorems work by
showing that the behavior of the posterior distribution on the full space Θ is
dominated by its behavior on this “sieve”.
Comment 2: Recall that by Egorov’s theorem [35, Lemma 1.36, p. 18], if a
sequence of finite, measurable functions ft(θ) converges pointwise to a finite,
measurable function f(θ) for Π0-almost-all θ ∈ G, then for each  > 0, there
is a (possibly empty) B ⊂ G such that Π0(B) ≤ , and the convergence is
uniform on G \ B. Thus the first two parts of the assumption really follow for
free from the measurability in θ of likelihoods and divergence rates. (That β
needs to be at least 2h(Θ) becomes apparent in the proof of Lemma 5, but that
could always be arranged.) The extra content comes in the third part of the
assumption, which could fail if the lowest-divergence hypotheses were also the
ones where the convergence was slowest, consistently falling into the bad sets B
allowed by Egorov’s theorem.
For each measurable A ⊆ Θ, for every δ > 0, there exists a random natural
number τ(A, δ) such that
t−1 log Π0 (ARt) ≤ δ + lim sup
t
t−1 log Π0 (ARt)
for all t > τ(A, δ), provided the lim sup is finite. We need this random last-entry
time τ(A, δ) to state the next assumption.
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Assumption 6 The sets Gt of the previous assumption can be chosen so that,
for every δ, the inequality t ≥ τ(Gt, δ) holds a.s. for all sufficiently large t.
The fraction of the prior probability mass outside of Gt is exponentially small
in t, with the decay rate large enough that (Lemma 5) the posterior probability
mass outside Gt also goes to zero. Using the analogy to the sieve again, the
meaning of the assumption is that the convergence of the log-likelihood ratio is
sufficiently fast, and the relaxation of the sieve is sufficiently slow, that, at least
eventually, every set Gt has δ-converged by t, the time when we start using it.
To show convergence of the posterior measure, we need to be able to control
the convergence of the log-likelihood on sets smaller than the whole parameter
space.
Assumption 7 The sets Gt of the previous two assumptions can be chosen so
that, for any set A with Π0(A) > 0, h(Gt ∩A)→ h(A).
Assumption 7 could be replaced by the logically-weaker assumption that for
each set A, there exist a sequence of sets Gt,A satisfying the equivalents of As-
sumptions 5 and 6 for the prior measure restricted to A. Since the most straight-
forward way to check such an assumption would be to verify Assumption 7 as
stated, the extra generality does not seem worth it.
2.2.1. Verification of Assumptions for the Example
Since every θ ∈ Θ is a finite-order Markov chain, and P is stationary and ergodic,
Assumption 1 is unproblematic, while Assumptions 2 and 3 hold by virtue of
[1].
It is easy to check that infθ∈Θk h(θ) > 0 for each k. (The infimum is not in
general attained by any θ ∈ Θk, though it could be if the chains were allowed
to have some transition probabilities equal to zero.) The infimum over Θ as
a whole, however, is zero. Also, h(θ) < ∞ everywhere (because none of the
hypotheses’ transition probabilities are zero), so the possible set I of θ with
infinite divergence rates is empty, disposing of Assumption 4.
Verifying the remaining assumptions means building a sequence Gt of in-
creasing subsets of Θ on which the convergence of t−1 logRt is uniform and suf-
ficiently rapid, and ensuring that the prior probability of these sets grows fast
enough. This will be done by exploiting some finite-sample deviation bounds for
the even process, which in turn rest on its mixing properties and the method
of types. Details are referred to Appendix B. The upshot is that the sets Gt
consist of chains whose order is less than or equal to log t2/3+ − 1, for some  > 0,
and where the absolute logarithm of all the transition probabilities is bounded
by Ctγ , where the positive constant C is arbitrary but 0 < γ < 2/3+/22/3+ . (With
a different strictly sofic process P , the constant 2/3 in the preceding expressions
should be replaced by hP .) The exponential rate β > 0 for the prior probability
of Gct can be chosen to be arbitrarily small.
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3. Results
I first give the theorems here, without proof. The proofs, in §§3.1–3.5, are ac-
companied by re-statements of the theorems, for the reader’s convenience.
There are six theorems. The first upper-bounds the growth rate of the pos-
terior density at a given point θ in Θ. The second matches the upper bound on
the posterior density with a lower bound, together providing the growth-rate for
the posterior density. The third is that Πt(A) → 0 for any set with J(A) > 0,
showing that the posterior concentrates on the divergence-minimizing part of
the hypothesis space. The fourth is a kind of large deviations principle for the
posterior measure. The fifth bounds the asymptotic Hellinger and total vari-
ation distances between the posterior predictive distribution and the actual
conditional distribution of the next observation. Finally, the sixth theorem es-
tablishes rates of convergence.
The first result uses only Assumptions 1–3. (It is not very interesting, how-
ever, unless 4 is also true.) The latter three, however, all depend on finer control
of the integrated likelihood, and so finer control of the prior, as embodied in
Assumptions 5–6. More exactly, those additional assumptions concern the inter-
play between the prior and the data-generating process, restricting the amount
of prior probability which can be given to hypotheses whose log-likelihoods
converge excessively slowly under P . I build to the first result in the next sub-
section, then turn to the control of the integrated likelihood and its consequences
in the next three sub-sections, and then consider how these results apply to the
example.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1–3, with probability 1, for all θ where pi0(θ) >
0,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) ≤ −J(θ)
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1–6, for all θ ∈ Θ where pi0(θ) > 0,
lim
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) = −J(θ)
with probability 1.
Theorem 3 Make Assumptions 1–7. Pick any set A ∈ T where Π0(A) > 0 and
h(A) > h(Θ). Then Πt(A)→ 0 a.s.
Theorem 4 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, if A ∈ T is such that
− lim sup t−1 log Π0(A ∩Gct) = β′ ≥ 2h(A)
then
lim
t→∞
1
t
log Πt(A) = −J(A)
In particular, this holds whenever 2h(A) < β or A ⊂ ⋂∞k=nGk for some n.
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Theorem 5 Under Assumptions 1–7, with probability 1,
lim sup
t→∞
ρ2H(P
t, F tΠ) ≤ h(Θ)
lim sup
t→∞
ρ2TV (P
t, F tΠ) ≤ 4h(Θ)
where ρH and ρTV are, respectively, the Hellinger and total variation metrics.
Theorem 6 Make assumptions 1–7, and pick a positive sequence t where t →
0, tt →∞. If, for each δ > 0,
τ(Gt ∩N ct , δ) ≤ t
eventually almost surely, then
Πt(Nt)→ 1
with probability 1.
3.1. Upper Bound on the Posterior Density
The primary result of this section is a pointwise upper bound on the growth rate
of the posterior density. To establish it, I use some subsidiary lemmas, which
also recur in later proofs. Lemma 2 extends the almost-sure convergence of the
likelihood (Assumption 3) from holding pointwise in Θ to holding simultaneously
for all θ on a (possibly random) set of Π0-measure 1. Lemma 3 shows that the
prior-weighted likelihood ratio, Π0 (Rt) tends to be at least exp {−th(Θ)}. (Both
assertions are made more precise in the lemmas themselves.)
I begin with a proposition about exchanging the order of universal quantifiers
(with almost-sure caveats).
Lemma 1 Let Q ⊂ Θ×Ω be jointly measurable, with sections Qθ = {ω : (ω, θ) ∈ Q}
and Qω = {θ : (ω, θ) ∈ Q}. If, for some probability measure P on Ω,
∀θP (Qθ) = 1 (2)
then for any probability measure Π on Θ
P ({ω : Π (Qω) = 1}) = 1 (3)
In words, if, for all θ, some property holds a.s., then a.s. the property holds
simultaneously for almost all θ.
Proof: Since Q is measurable, for all ω and θ, the sections are measurable,
and the measures of the sections, P (Qθ) and Π(Qω), are measurable functions
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of θ and ω, respectively. Using Fubini’s theorem,∫
Θ
P (Qθ)dΠ(θ) =
∫
Θ
∫
Ω
1Q(ω, θ)dP (ω)dΠ(θ)
=
∫
Ω
∫
Θ
1Q(ω, θ)dΠ(θ)dP (ω)
=
∫
Ω
Π(Qω)dP (ω)
By hypothesis, however, P (Qθ) = 1 for all θ. Hence it must be the case that
Π(Qω) = 1 for P -almost-all ω. (In fact, the set of ω for which this is true must
be a measurable set.) 
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1–3, there exists a set C ⊆ Ξ∞, with P (C) = 1,
where, for every y ∈ C, there exists a Qy ∈ T such that, for every θ ∈ Qy, Eq.
1 holds. Moreover, Π0(Qy) = 1.
Proof: Let the set Q consist of the θ, ω pairs where Eq. 1 holds, i.e., for
which
lim
1
t
logRt(θ, ω) = −h(θ) ,
being explicit about the dependence of the likelihood ratio on ω. Assumption 3
states that ∀θP (Qθ) = 1, so applying Lemma 1 just needs the verification that
Q is jointly measurable. But, by Assumptions 1 and 2, h(·) is T -measurable, and
Rt(θ) is σ (Xt1)× T -measurable for each t, so the set Q where the convergence
holds are σ (X∞1 )× T -measurable. Everything then follows from the preceding
lemma. 
Remark: Lemma 2 generalizes Lemma 3 in [4]. Lemma 1 is a specialization
of the quantifier-reversal lemma used in [45] to prove PAC-Bayesian theorems
for learning classifiers. Lemma 1 could be used to extend any of the results
below which hold a.s. for each θ to ones which a.s. hold simultaneously almost
everywhere in Θ. This may seem too good to be true, like an alchemist’s recipe
for turning the lead of pointwise limits into the gold of uniform convergence.
Fortunately or not, however, the lemma tells us nothing about the rate of con-
vergence, and is compatible with its varying across Θ from instantaneous to
arbitrarily slow, so uniform laws need stronger assumptions.
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1–3, for every  > 0, it is almost sure that the
ratio between the integrated likelihood and the true probability density falls below
exp {−t(h(Θ) + )} only finitely often:
P {x∞1 : Π0 (Rt) ≤ exp {−t(h(Θ) + )}, i.o.} = 0 (4)
and as a corollary, with probability 1,
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≥ −h(Θ) (5)
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Proof: It’s enough to show that Eq. 4 holds for all x∞1 in the set C from
the previous lemma, since that set has probability 1.
Let N/2 be the set of all θ in the support of Π0 such that h(θ) ≤ h(Θ) + /2.
Since x∞1 ∈ C, the previous lemma tells us there exists a set Qx∞1 of θ for which
Eq. 1 holds under the sequence x∞1 .
exp {t(+ h(Θ))}Π0 (Rt) =
∫
Θ
Rt(θ) exp {t(+ h(Θ))}dΠ0(θ)
≥
∫
N/2∩Qx∞
1
Rt(θ) exp {t(+ h(Θ))}dΠ0(θ)
=
∫
N/2∩Qx∞
1
exp
{
t
[
+ h(Θ) +
logRt(θ)
t
]}
dΠ0(θ)
By Assumption 3,
lim
t→∞
1
t
logRt(θ) = −h(θ)
and for all θ ∈ N/2, h(θ) ≤ h(Θ) + /2, so
lim inf
t→∞ exp
{
t
[
+ h(Θ) +
1
t
logRt(θ)
]}
=∞
a.s., for all θ ∈ N/2 ∩ Qx∞1 . We must have Π0(N/2) > 0, otherwise h(Θ)
would not be the essential infimum, and we know from the previous lemma that
Π0(Qx∞1 ) = 1, so Π0(N/2 ∩Qx∞1 ) > 0. Thus, Fatou’s lemma gives
lim
t→∞
∫
N/2∩Qx∞
1
exp
{
t
[
+ h(Θ) +
1
t
logRt(θ)
]}
dΠ0(θ) =∞
so
lim
t→∞ exp {t(+ h(Θ))}Π0 (Rt) =∞
and hence
Π0 (Rt) > exp {−t(+ h(Θ))} (6)
for all but finitely many t. Since this holds for all x∞1 ∈ C, and P (C) = 1,
Equation 6 holds a.s., as was to be shown. The corollary statement follows
immediately. 
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1–3, with probability 1, for all θ where pi0(θ) >
0,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) ≤ −J(θ) (7)
Proof: As remarked,
pit(θ) = pi0(θ)
Rt(θ)
Π0 (Rt)
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so
1
t
log pit(θ) =
1
t
log pi0(θ) +
1
t
logRt(θ)− 1
t
log Π0 (Rt)
By Assumption 3, for each  > 0, it’s almost sure that
1
t
logRt(θ) ≤ −h(θ) + /2
for all sufficiently large t, while by Lemma 3, it’s almost sure that
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≥ −h(Θ)− /2
for all sufficiently large t. Hence, with probability 1,
1
t
log pit(θ) ≤ h(Θ)− h(θ) + + 1
t
log pi0(θ)
for all sufficiently large t. Hence
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) ≤ h(Θ)− h(θ) = −J(θ)

Lemma 3 gives a lower bound on the integrated likelihood ratio, showing that
in the long run it has to be at least as big as exp {−th(Θ))}. (More precisely,
it is significantly smaller than that on vanishingly few occasions.) It does not,
however, rule out being larger. Ideally, we would be able to match this lower
bound with an upper bound of the same form, since h(Θ) is the best attainable
divergence rate, and, by Lemma 2, log likelihood ratios per unit time are con-
verging to divergence rates for Π0-almost-all θ, so values of θ for which h(θ) are
close to h(Θ) should come to dominate the integral in Π0 (Rt). It would then
be fairly straightforward to show convergence of the posterior distribution.
Unfortunately, additional assumptions are required for such an upper bound,
because (as earlier remarked) Lemma 2 does not give uniform convergence,
merely universal convergence; with a large enough space of hypotheses, the
slowest pointwise convergence rates can be pushed arbitrarily low. For instance,
let xt1 be the distribution on Ξ
∞ which assigns probability 1 to endless repeti-
tions of xt1; clearly, under this distribution, seeing X
t
1 = x
t
1 is almost certain. If
such measures fall within the support of Π0, they will dominate the likelihood,
even though h(xt1) =∞ under all but very special circumstances (e.g., P = xt1).
Generically, then, the likelihood and the posterior weight of xt1 will rapidly
plummet at times T > t. To ensure convergence of the posterior, overly-flexible
measures like the family of xt1’s must be either excluded from the support of
Π0 (possibly because they are excluded from Θ), or be assigned so little prior
weight that they do not end up dominating the integrated likelihood, or the
posterior must concentrate on them.
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3.2. Convergence of Posterior Density via Control of the Integrated
Likelihood
The next two lemmas tell us that sets in Θ of exponentially-small prior measure
make vanishingly small contributions to the integrated likelihood, and so to the
posterior. They do not require assumptions beyond those used so far, but their
application will.
Lemma 4 Make Assumptions 1–3, and chose a sequence of sets Bt ⊂ Θ such
that, for all sufficiently large t, Π0(Bt) ≤ α exp {−tβ} for some α, β > 0. Then,
almost surely,
Π0 (RtBt) ≤ exp {−tβ/2} (8)
for all but finitely many t.
Proof: By Markov’s inequality. First, use Fubini’s theorem and the chain
rule for Radon-Nikodym derivatives to calculate the expectation value of the
ratio.
E [Π0 (RtBt)] =
∫
X t
dP (xt1)
∫
Bt
dΠ0(θ)Rt(θ)
=
∫
Bt
dΠ0(θ)
∫
Xn
dP (xt1)
dFθ
dP
(xt1)
=
∫
Bt
dΠ0(θ)
∫
X t
dFθ(xt1)
=
∫
Bt
dΠ0(θ)
= Π0(Bt)
Now apply Markov’s inequality:
P
{
xt1 : Π0 (RtBt) > exp {−tβ/2}
} ≤ exp {tβ/2}E [Π0 (RtBt)]
= exp {tβ/2}Π0(Bt)
≤ α exp {−tβ/2}
for all sufficiently large t. Since these probabilities are summable, the Borel-
Cantelli lemma implies that, with probability 1, Eq. 8 holds for all but finitely
many t. 
The next lemma asserts a sequence of exponentially-small sets makes a (log-
arithmically) negligible contribution to the posterior distribution, provided the
exponent is large enough compared to h(Θ).
Lemma 5 Let Bt be as in the previous lemma. If β > 2h(Θ), then
Π0 (RtBct )
Π0 (Rt)
→ 1 (9)
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Proof: Begin with the likelihood integrated over Bt rather than its comple-
ment, and apply Lemmas 3 and 4: for any  > 0
Π0 (BtRt)
Π0 (Rn)
≤ exp {−tβ/2}
exp {−t[h(Θ) + ]} (10)
= exp {t[+ h(Θ)− β/2]} (11)
provided t is sufficiently large. If β > 2h(Θ), this bound can be made to go to
zero as t→∞ by taking  to be sufficiently small. Since
Π0 (Rt) = Π0 (BctRt) + Π0 (BtRt)
it follows that
Π0 (BctRt)
Π0 (Rt)
→ 1

Lemma 6 Make Assumptions 1–3, and take any set G on which the conver-
gence in Eq. 1 is uniform and where Π0(G) > 0. Then, P -a.s.,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (GRt) ≤ −h(G) (12)
Proof: Pick any  > 0. By the hypothesis of uniform convergence, there
almost surely exists a T () such that, for all t ≥ T () and for all θ ∈ G,
t−1 logRt(θ) ≤ −h(θ) + . Hence
t−1 log Π0 (GRt) = t−1 log Π0 (G exp {logRt}) (13)
≤ t−1 log Π0 (G exp {t[−h+ ]}) (14)
= + t−1 log Π0 (G exp {−th}) (15)
Let Π0|G denote the probability measure formed by conditioning Π0 to be in
the set G. Then
Π0 (Gz) = Π0(G)
∫
G
dΠ0|G(θ)z(θ)
for any integrable function z. Apply this to the last term from Eq. 15.
log Π0 (G exp {−th}) = log Π0(G) + log
∫
G
dΠ0|G(θ) exp {−th(θ)}
The second term on the right-hand side is the cumulant generating function of
−h(θ) with respect to Π0|G, which turns out (cf. 6) to have exactly the right
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behavior as t→∞.
1
t
log
∫
G
dΠ0|G(θ) exp {−th(θ)} = 1
t
log
∫
G
dΠ0|G(θ)|exp {−h(θ)}|t
=
1
t
log
((∫
G
dΠ0|G(θ)|exp {−h(θ)}|t
)1/t)t
=
1
t
(
t log ‖exp {−h(θ)}‖t,Π0|G
)
= log ‖exp {−h(θ)}‖t,Π0|G (16)
Since h(θ) ≥ 0, exp {−h(θ)} ≤ 1, and the Lp norm of the latter will grow
towards its L∞ norm as p grows. Hence, for sufficiently large t,
log ‖exp {−h(θ)}‖t,Π0|G ≤ log ‖exp {−h(θ)}‖∞,Π0|G + 
= − ess inf
θ∈G
h(θ) + 
= −h(G) +  (17)
where the next-to-last step uses the monotonicity of log and exp.
Putting everything together, we have that, for any  > 0 and all sufficiently
large t,
t−1 log Π0 (GRt) ≤ −h(G) + 2+ log Π0(G)
t
(18)
Hence the limit superior of the left-hand side is at most −h(G). 
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1–6,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ) (19)
Proof: By Lemma 5,
lim
t→∞
Π0 (Rt)
Π0 (GtRt)
= 1
implying that
lim
t→∞ log Π0 (Rt)− log Π0 (GtRt) = 0
so for every  > 0, for t large enough
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ /3 + log Π0 (GtRt)
Consequently, again for large enough t,
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ /3t+ 1
t
log Π0 (GtRt)
Now, for each set G, for every  > 0, if t ≥ τ(G, /3) then
1
t
log Π0 (GRt) ≤ −h(G) + /3
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by Lemma 6. By Assumption 6, t ≥ τ(Gt, /3) for all sufficiently large t. Hence
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Gt) + /3t+ /3
for all  > 0 and all t sufficiently large. Since, by Assumption 5, h(Gt)→ h(Θ),
for every  > 0, h(Gt) is within /3 of h(Θ) for large enough t, so
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ) + /3t+ /3 + /3
Thus, for every  > 0, then we have that
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ) + 
for large enough t, or, in short,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ)

Lemma 8 Under Assumptions 1–6, if Π0(I) = 0, then
1
t
log Π0 (Rt)→ −h(Θ) (20)
almost surely.
Proof: Combining Lemmas 3 and 7,
−h(Θ) ≤ lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ)

The standard version of Egorov’s theorem concerns sequences of finite mea-
surable functions converging pointwise to a finite measurable limiting function.
However, the proof is easily adapted to an infinite limiting function.
Lemma 9 Let ft(θ) be a sequence of finite, measurable functions, converging
to ∞ almost everywhere (Π0) on I. Then for each  > 0, there exists a possibly-
empty B ⊂ I such that Π0(B) < , and the convergence is uniform on I \ B.
Proof: Parallel to the usual proof of Egorov’s theorem. Begin by removing
the measure-zero set of points on which pointwise convergence fails; for simplic-
ity, keep the name I for the remaining set. For each natural number t and k, let
Bt,k ≡ {θ ∈ I : ft(θ) < k} — the points where the function fails to be at least
k by step t. Since the limit of ft is ∞ everywhere on I, each θ has a last t such
that ft(θ) < k, no matter how big k is. Hence
⋂∞
t=1Bt,k = ∅. By continuity of
measure, for any δ > 0, there exists an n such that Π0(Bt,k) < δ if t ≥ n. Fix 
as in the statement of the lemma, and set δ = 2−k. Finally, set B =
⋃∞
k=1Bn,k.
By the union bound, Π0(B) ≤ , and by construction, the rate of convergence
to ∞ is uniform on I \B. 
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Lemma 10 The conclusion of Lemma 8 is unchanged if Π0(I) > 0.
Proof: The integrated likelihood ratio can be divided into two parts, one
from integrating over I and one from integrating over its complement. Previous
lemmas have established that the latter is upper bounded, in the long run, by a
quantity which is O(exp {−h(Θ)t}). We can use Lemma 9 to divide I into a se-
quence of sub-sets, on which the convergence is uniform, and hence on which the
integrated likelihood shrinks faster than any exponential function, and remain-
der sets, of prior measure no more than α exp {−nβ}, on which the convergence
is less than uniform (i.e., slow). If we ensure that β > 2h(Θ), however, by
Lemma 5 the remainder sets’ contributions to the integrated likelihood is negli-
gible in comparison to that of Θ \ I. Said another way, if there are alternatives
which a consistent test would rule out at a merely exponential rate, those which
would be rejected at a supra-exponential rate end up making vanishingly small
contributions to the integrated likelihood. 
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1–6, for all θ ∈ Θ where pi0(θ) > 0,
lim
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) = −J(θ) (21)
with probability 1.
Proof: Theorem 1 says that, for all θ,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) ≤ −J(θ)
a.s., so there just needs to be a matching lim inf. Pick any  > 0. By Assumption
3, it’s almost certain that, for all sufficiently large t,
1
t
logRt(θ) ≥ −h(θ)− /2
while by Lemma 10, it’s almost certain that for all sufficiently large t,
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ) + /2
Combining these as in the proof of Theorem 1, it’s almost certain that for all
sufficiently large t
1
t
log pit(θ) ≥ h(Θ)− h(θ)− 
so
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log pit(θ) ≥ h(Θ)− h(θ) = −J(θ)

C. R. Shalizi/Dynamics of Bayesian Updating 21
3.3. Convergence and Large Deviations of the Posterior Measure
Adding Assumption 7 to those before it implies that the posterior measure
concentrates on sets A ⊂ Θ where h(A) = h(Θ).
Theorem 3 Make Assumptions 1–7. Pick any set A ∈ T where Π0(A) > 0 and
h(A) > h(Θ). Then Πt(A)→ 0 a.s.
Proof:
Πt(A) = Πt(A ∩Gt) + Πt(A ∩Gct)
≤ Πt(A ∩Gt) + Πt(Gct)
The last term is easy to bound. From Eq. 11 in the proof of Lemma 5,
Πt(Gct) =
Π0 (RtGct)
Π0 (Rt)
≤ exp {t[+ h(Θ)− β/2]} (22)
for any  > 0, for all sufficiently large t, almost surely. Since β > 2h(Θ), the
whole expression → 0 as t→∞.
To bound Πt(A ∩ Gt), reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 7, but invoking
Assumption 7, leads to the conclusion that, for any  > 0, with probability 1,
1
t
log Π0 (Rt(A ∩Gt)) ≤ −h(A) + 
for all sufficiently large t. Recall that by Lemma 3, for all  > 0 it’s almost sure
that
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≥ −h(Θ)− 
for all sufficiently large n. Hence for every  > 0, it’s almost certain that for all
sufficiently large t,
Πt(A ∩Gt) ≤ exp {t[h(Θ)− h(A) + 2]} (23)
Since h(A) > h(Θ), by picking  small enough the right hand side goes to zero.

The proof of the theorem provides an exponential upper bound on the pos-
terior measure of sets where h(A) > h(Θ). In fact, even without the final as-
sumption needed for the theorem, there is an exponential lower bound on that
posterior measure.
Lemma 11 Make Assumption 1–6, and pick a set A ∈ T with Π0(A) > 0.
Then
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log Πt(A) ≥ −J(A) (24)
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Proof: Reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3, it is easy to see that
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (RtA) ≥ −h(A)
and by Lemma 7,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log Π0 (Rt) ≤ −h(Θ)
hence
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log Πt(A) = lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log
Π0 (RtA)
Π0 (Rt)
≥ −h(A) + h(Θ)

Theorem 4 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, if A ∈ T is such that
− lim sup t−1 log Π0(A ∩Gct) = β′ ≥ 2h(A) (25)
then
lim
t→∞
1
t
log Πt(A) = h(Θ)− h(A) (26)
In particular, this holds whenever 2h(A) < β or A ⊂ ⋂∞k=nGk for some n.
Proof: Trivially,
1
t
log Πt(A) =
1
t
log Πt(A ∩Gt) + Π(A ∩Gct)
From Eq. 23 from the proof of Theorem 3, we know that, for any  > 0,
Πt(A ∩Gt) ≤ exp {t[h(Θ)− h(A) + ]}
a.s. for sufficiently large t. On the other hand, under the hypothesis of the
theorem, the proof of Eq. 22 can be imitated for Πt(A∩Gct), with the conclusion
that, for all  > 0,
Πt(A ∩Gct) ≤ exp {t[h(Θ)− β′/2 + ]}
again a.s. for sufficiently large t. Since β′/2 > h(A), Eq. 26 follows.
Finally, to see that this holds for any A where h(A) < β/2, observe that we
can always upper bound Πt(A∩Gct) by Πt(Gct), and the latter goes to zero with
rate at least −β/2. 
Remarks: Because h(A) is the essential infimum of h(θ) on the set A, as
the set shrinks h(A) grows. Sets where h(A) is much larger than h(Θ) tend
accordingly to be small. The difficulty is that the sets Gct are also small, and
conceivably overlap so heavily with A that the integral of the likelihood over A is
dominated by the part coming from A∩Gct . Eventually this will shrink towards
C. R. Shalizi/Dynamics of Bayesian Updating 23
zero exponentially, but perhaps only at the comparatively slow rate h(Θ)−β/2,
rather than the faster rate h(Θ)−h(A) attained on the well-behaved part A∩Gt.
Theorem 4 is close to, but not quite, a large deviations principle on Θ. We
have shown that the posterior probability of any arbitrary set A where J(A) > 0
goes to zero with an exponential rate at least equal to
β/2 ∧ ess inf
θ∈A
J(θ) = ess inf
θ∈A
β/2 ∧ J(θ) (27)
But in a true LDP, the rate would have to be an infimum, not just an essential
infimum, of a point-wise rate function. This deficiency could be removed by
means of additional assumptions on Π0 and h(θ).
Ref. [22] obtains proper large and even moderate deviations principles, but
for the location of Πt in the space M1(Θ) of all distributions on Θ, rather
than on Θ itself. Essentially, they use the assumption of IID sampling, which
makes the posterior a function of the empirical distribution, to leverage the LDP
for the latter into an LDP for the former. This strategy may be more widely
applicable but goes beyond the scope of this paper. Papangelou [49], assuming
that Θ consists of discrete-valued Markov chains of arbitrary order and P is in
the support of the prior, and using methods similar to those in Appendix B,
derives a result which is closely related to Theorem 4. In fact, fixing the sets Gt
as in Appendix B, Theorem 4 implies the theorem of [49].
3.4. Generalization Performance
Lemma 10 shows that, in hindsight, the Bayesian learner does a good job of
matching the data: the log integrated likelihood ratio per time-step approaches
−h(Θ), the limit of values attainable by individual hypotheses within the sup-
port of the prior. This leaves open, however, the question of the prospective or
generalization performance.
What we want is for the posterior predictive distribution F tΠ to approach the
true conditional distribution of future events P t, but we cannot in general hope
for the convergence to be complete, since our models are mis-specified. The next
theorem uses h(Θ) to put an upper bound on how far the posterior predictive
distribution can remain from the true predictive distribution.
Theorem 5 Under Assumptions 1–7, with probability 1,
lim sup
t→∞
ρ2H(P
t, F tΠ) ≤ h(Θ) (28)
lim sup
t→∞
ρ2TV (P
t, F tΠ) ≤ 4h(Θ) (29)
where ρH and ρTV are, respectively, the Hellinger and total variation metrics.
Proof: Recall the well-known inequalities relating Hellinger distance to
Kullback-Leibler divergence on the one side and to total variation distance on
the other [30]: for any two distributions P and Q,
ρ2H(P,Q) ≤ D(P‖Q) (30)
ρTV (P,Q) ≤ 2ρH(P,Q) (31)
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It’s enough to prove Eq. 28, and Eq. 29 then follows from Eq. 31.
Abbreviate ρH(P t, F tθ) by ρH(t, θ). Pick any  > h(Θ), and say that A ={
θ : ρ2H(t, θ) > 
}
. By convexity and Jensen’s inequality,
ρ2H(P
t, F tΠ) ≤
∫
Θ
ρ2H(t, θ)dΠn(θ)
=
∫
Ac
ρ2H(t, θ)dΠn(θ) +
∫
A
ρ2H(t, θ)dΠn(θ)
= Πt(Ac) +
√
2Πt(A)
By Eq. 30, d(θ) > ρ2H(t, θ). Thus h(A) ≥ , and  > h(θ) so, by Theorem 3,
Πt(A)→ 0 a.s. Hence
ρ2H(P
t, F tΠ) ≤ 
eventually almost surely. Since this holds for any  > h(Θ), Eq. 28 follows. 
Remark: It seems like it should be possible to prove a similar result for the
divergence rate of the predictive distribution, namely that
lim sup
t→∞
h(Πt) ≤ h(Θ)
but it would take a different approach, because h(·) has no upper bound, and
the posterior weight of the high-divergence regions might decay too slowly to
compensate for this.
3.5. Rate of Convergence
Recall that N was defined as the set of all θ such that h(θ) ≤ h(Θ) + .
(This is measurable by Assumption 2.) The set N c thus consists of all hypothe-
ses whose divergence rate is more than  above the essential infimum h(Θ).
For any  > 0, Πt(N c ) → 0 a.s., by Theorem 3, and for sufficiently small ,
limt→∞ t−1 log Πt(N c ) = − a.s., by Theorem 4. For such sets, in other words,
for any δ > 0, it’s almost certain that for all sufficiently large t,
Πt(N c ) ≤ exp {−t(− δ)} (32)
Now consider a non-increasing positive sequence t → 0. Presumably if t decays
slowly enough, Πt(N ct) will still go to zero, even though the sets N
c
t are non-
decreasing. Examination of Eq. 32 suggests, naively, that this will work if tt →
∞, i.e., if the decay of t is strictly sublinear. This is correct under an additional
condition, similar to Assumption 6.
Theorem 6 Make assumptions 1–7, and pick a positive sequence t where t →
0, tt →∞. If, for each δ > 0,
τ(Gt ∩N ct , δ) ≤ t (33)
eventually almost surely, then
Πt(Nt)→ 1 (34)
with probability 1.
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Proof: By showing that Πt(N ct) → 0 a.s. Begin by splitting the sets into
the parts inside the Gt, say Ut, and the parts outside:
Πt(N ct) = Πt(N
c
t ∩Gt) + Πt(N ct ∩Gct)
≤ Πt(Ut) + Πt(Gct)
From Lemma 4, the second term → 0 with probability 1, so for any η1 > 0, it
is ≤ η1 eventually a.s.
Turning to the other term, Theorem 4 applies to Uk for any fixed k, so
lim
t→∞ t
−1 log Πt(Uk) = h(Θ)− h(Uk)
(a.s.), implying, with Lemma 10, that
lim
t→∞ t
−1 log Π0 (UkRt) = −h(Uk)
(a.s.). By Eq. 33, for any η2 > 0,
t−1 log Π0 (UtRt) ≤ −h(Ut) + η2
eventually almost surely. By Lemma 10 and Bayes’s rule, then,
t−1 log Πt(Ut) ≤ h(Θ)− h(Ut) + η3
eventually a.s., for any η3 > 0. Putting things back together, eventually a.s.,
Πt(N ct) ≤ exp {t(h(Θ)− h(Ut) + η2)}+ η1
≤ exp {t(−t + η3)}+ η1
Since tt → ∞, the first term goes to zero, and since η1 can be as small as
desired,
Πt(N ct)→ 0
almost surely. 
The theorem lets us attain rates of convergence just slower than t−1 (so
that tt → ∞). This matches existing results on rates of posterior convergence
for mis-specified models with IID data in [68, Corollary 5.2] (t−1 in the Renyi
divergence) and in [38] (t−1/2 in the Hellinger distance; recall Eq. 30), and for
correctly-specified non-IID models in [29] (t−α for suitable α < 1/2, again in
the Hellinger distance).
3.6. Application of the Results to the Example
Because h(Θ) = 0, while h(θ) > 0 everywhere, the behavior of the posterior is
somewhat peculiar. Every compact set K ⊂ Θ has J(K) > 0, so by Theorem
3, Πt(K) → 0. On the other hand, Πt(Gt) → 1 — the sequence of good sets
contains models of increasingly high order, with increasingly weak constraints on
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the transition probabilities, and this lets its posterior weight grow, even though
every individual compact set within it ultimately loses all weight.
In fact, each Gt is a convex set, and h(·) is a convex function, so there is a
unique minimizer of the divergence rate within each good set. Conditional on
being within Gt, the posterior probability becomes increasingly concentrated on
neighborhoods of this minimizer, but the minimizer itself keeps moving, since it
can always be improved upon by increasing the order of the chain and reducing
some transition probabilities. (Recall that P gives probability 0 to sequences
010, 01110, etc., where the block of 1’s is of odd length, but Θ contains only
chains with strictly positive transition probabilities.)
Outside of the good sets, the likelihood is peaked around hypotheses which
provide stationary and smooth approximations to the xt1 distribution that end-
lessly repeats the observed sequence to date. The divergence rates of these hy-
potheses are however extremely high, so none of them retains its high likelihood
for very long. (xt1 is a Markov chain of order t, but it is not in Θ, since it’s
neither stationary nor does it have strictly positive transition probabilities. It
can be made stationary, however, by assigning equal probability to each of its
t states; this gives the data likelihood 1/t rather than 1, but that still is vastly
larger than the O(−ct) log-likelihoods of better models. (Recall that even the
log-likelihood of the true distribution is only O(− 23 t).) Allowing each of the t
states to have a probability 0 < ι 1 of not proceeding to the next state in the
periodic sequence is easy and leads to only an O(ιt) reduction in the likelihood
up to time t. In the long run, however, it means that the log-likelihood will be
O(t log ι).) In any case, the total posterior probability of Gct is going to zero
exponentially.
Despite — or rather, because of — the fact that no point in Θ is the ne plus
ultra around which the posterior concentrates, the conditions of Theorem 5 are
met, and since h(Θ) = 0, the posterior predictive distribution converges to the
true predictive distribution in the Hellinger and total variation metrics. That is,
the weird gyrations of the posterior do not prevent us from attaining predictive
consistency. This is so even though the posterior always gives the wrong answer
to such basic questions as “Is P (Xt+2t = 010) > 0?” — inferences which in this
case can be made correctly through non-Bayesian methods [47; 58].
4. Discussion
The crucial assumptions were 3, 5 and 6. Together, these amount to assuming
that the time-averaged log likelihood ratio converges universally; to fashioning a
sieve, successively embracing regions of Θ where the convergence is increasingly
ill-behaved; and the hope that the prior weight of the remaining bad sets can
be bounded exponentially.
Using asymptotic equipartition in place of the law of large numbers is fairly
straightforward. Both results belong to the general family of ergodic theorems,
which allow us to take sufficiently long sample paths as representative of entire
processes. The unique a.s. limit in Eq. 1 can be replaced with a.s. convergence to
C. R. Shalizi/Dynamics of Bayesian Updating 27
a distinct limit in each ergodic component of P . However, the notation gets ugly,
so the reader should regard h(θ) as that random limit, and treat all subsequent
results as relative to the ergodic decomposition of P . (Cf. [31; 17].) It may
be possible to weaken this assumption yet further, but it is hard to see how
Bayesian updating can succeed if the past performance of the likelihood is not
a guide to future results.
A bigger departure from the usual approach to posterior convergence may
be allowing h(Θ) > 0; this rules out posterior consistency, to begin with. More
subtly, it requires β > 2h(Θ). This means that a prior distribution which satisfies
the assumptions for one value of P may not satisfy them for another, depending,
naturally enough, on just how mis-specified the hypotheses are, and how much
weight the prior puts on very bad hypotheses. On the other hand, when h(Θ) =
0, Theorem 5 implies predictive consistency, as in the example.
Assumption 6 is frankly annoying. It ensures that the log likelihood ratio
converges fast enough, at least on the good sets, that we can be confident that
integrated likelihood of Gt has converged well by the time we want Gt to start
dominating the prior. It was shaped, however, to fill a hole in the proof of
Lemma 7 rather than more natural considerations. The result is that verify-
ing the assumption in its present form means proving the sub-linear growth
rate of sequences of random last entry times, and these times are not gener-
ally convenient to work with. (Cf. Appendix B.) It would be nice to replace
it with a bracketing or metric entropy condition, as in [4; 68] or similar forms
of capacity control, as used in [46; 63]. Alternately, the uniformly consistent
test conditions widely employed in Bayesian nonparametrics [30; 67] have been
adapted the mis-specified setting by [38], where the tests become reminiscent of
the “model selection tests” used in econometrics [64]. Since the latter can work
for dynamical models [51], this approach may also work here. In any event, re-
placing Assumption 6 with more primitive, comprehensible and easily-verified
conditions seems a promising direction for future work.
These results go some way toward providing a frequentist explanation of the
success of Bayesian methods in many practical problems. Under these condi-
tions, the posterior is increasingly weighted towards the parts of Θ which are
closest (in the Kullback-Leibler sense) to the data-generating process P . For a
Πt(A) to persistently be much more or much less than ≈ exp {−tJ(A)}, R(θ)
must be persistently far from exp {−th(θ)}, not just for isolated θ ∈ A, but a
whole positive-measure subset of them. With a reasonably smooth prior, this
requires a run of bad luck amounting almost to a conspiracy. From this point
of view, Bayesian inference amounts to introducing bias so as to reduce vari-
ance, and then relaxing the bias. Experience with frequentist non-parametric
methods shows this can work if the bias is relaxed sufficiently slowly, which is
basically what the assumptions here do. As the example shows, this can succeed
as a predictive tactic without supporting substantive inferences about the data-
generating process. However, 4–7 involve both the prior and the data-generating
process, and so cannot be verified using the prior alone. For empirical applica-
tions, it would be nice to have ways of checking them using sample data.
When h(Θ) > 0 and all the models are more or less wrong, there is an addi-
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tional advantage to averaging the models, as is done in the predictive distribu-
tion. (I owe the argument which follows to Scott Page; cf. [48].) With a convex
loss function `, such as squared error, Kullback-Leibler divergence, Hellinger
distance, etc., the loss of the predictive distribution `(Πt) will be no larger than
the posterior-mean loss of the individual models Πt (`(θ)). For squared error
loss, the difference is equal to the variance of the models’ predictions [40]. For
divergence, some algebra shows that
h(Πt) = Πt (h(θ)) + Πt
(
E
[
log
dFθ
dFΠ
])
(35)
where the second term on the RHS is again an indication of the diversity of the
models; the more different their predictions are, on the kind of data generated
by P , the smaller the error of made by the mixture. Having a diversity of
wrong answers can be as important as reducing the average error itself. The way
to accomplish this is to give more weight to models which make mostly good
predictions, but make different mistakes. This suggests that there may actually
be predictive benefits to having the posterior concentrate on a set containing
multiple hypotheses.
Finally, it is worth remarking on the connection between these results and
prediction with “mixtures of experts” [2; 10]. Formally, the role of the negative
log-likelihood and of Bayes’s rule in this paper was to provide a loss function and
a multiplicative scheme for updating the weights. All but one of the main results
(Theorem 5, which bounds Hellinger distance by Kullback-Leibler divergence)
would carry over to multiplicative weight training using a different loss function,
provided the accumulated loss per unit time converged.
Appendix A: Bayesian Updating as Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics are one of the fundamental models of evolutionary biology;
they represent the effects of natural selection in large populations, without (in
their simplest form) mutation, sex, or other sources of variation. [34] provides a
thorough discussion. They also arise as approximations to many other adaptive
processes, such as reinforcement learning [8; 9; 54]. In this appendix, I show that
Bayesian updating also follows the replicator equation.
We have a set of replicators — phenotypes, species, reproductive strategies,
etc. — indexed by θ ∈ Θ. The population density at type θ is pi(θ). We denote
by φt(θ) the fitness of θ at time t, i.e., the average number of descendants left
by each individual of type θ. The fitness function φt may in fact be a function of
pit, in which case it is said to be frequency-dependent. Many applications assume
the fitness function to be deterministic, rather than random, and further assume
that it is not an explicit function of t, but these restrictions are inessential.
The discrete-time replicator dynamic [34] is the dynamical system given by
the map
pit(θ) = pit−1(θ)
φt(θ)
Πt (φt)
(36)
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where Πt (φt) is the population mean fitness at t, i.e.,
Πt (φt) ≡
∫
Θ
φt(θ)dpit(θ)
The effect of these dynamics is to re-weight the population towards replicators
with above-average fitness.
It is immediate that Bayesian updating has the same form as Eq. 36, as soon
as we identify the distribution of replicators with the posterior distribution, and
the fitness with the conditional likelihood. In fact, Bayesian updating is an extra
simple case of the replicator equation, since the fitness function is frequency-
independent, though stochastic. Updating corresponds to the action of natural
selection, without variation, in a fluctuating environment. The results in the
main text assume (Assumption 3) that, despite the fluctuations, the long-run
fitness is nonetheless a determinate function of θ. The theorems assert that
selection can then be relied upon to drive the population to the peaks of the
long-run fitness function, at the cost of reducing the diversity of the population,
rather as in Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection [23; 34].
Corollary 1 Define the relative fitness φ˜t(θ) ≡ Lt(θ)/Πt (Lt). Under the con-
ditions of Theorem 2, the time average of the log relative fitness converges a.s.
1
t
t∑
n=1
log φ˜n(θ)→ −J(θ) + o(1) (37)
Proof: Unrolling Bayes’s rule over multiple observations,
pit(θ) = pi0(θ)
t∏
n=1
φ˜n(θ)
Take log of both sides, divide through by t, and invoke Theorem 2. 
Remark: Theorem 2 implies that
Ht ≡ |log pit(θ) + tJ(θ)|
is a.s. o(t). To strengthen Eq. 37 from convergence of the time average or Cesa`ro
mean to plain convergence requires forcing Ht −Ht−1 to be o(1), which it gen-
erally isn’t.
It is worth noting that Haldane [33] defined the intensity of selection on a
population as, in the present notation,
log
pit(θˆ)
pi0(θˆ)
where θˆ is the “optimal” (i.e., most selected-for) value of θ. For us, this intensity
of selection is just Rt(θˆ)/Π0 (Rt) where θˆ is the (or a) MLE.
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Appendix B: Verification of Assumptions 5–7 for the Example
Since the X∞1 process is a function of the S
∞
1 process, and the latter is an
aperiodic Markov chain, both are ψ-mixing (see [44; 60] for the definition of
ψ-mixing and demonstrations that aperiodic Markov chains and their functions
are ψ-mixing). Let P̂ (k)t be the empirical distribution of sequences of length k
obtained from xt1. For a Markov chain of order k, the likelihood is a function of
P̂
(k+1)
t alone; we will use this and the ergodic properties of the data-generating
process to construct sets on which the time-averaged log-likelihood converges
uniformly. Doing this will involve constraining both the order of the Markov
chains and their transition probabilities, and gradually relaxing the constraints.
It will simplify notation if from here on all logarithms are taken to base 2.
Pick  > 0 and let k(t) be an increasing positive-integer-valued function of t,
k(t) → ∞, subject to the limit k(t) ≤ log thP+ , where hP is the Shannon entropy
rate of P , which direct calculation shows is 2/3. The ψ-mixing property of X∞1
implies [60, p. 179] that
P (pTV (P̂
(k(t)
t , P
(k(t))) > δ) ≤ log t
h+ 
2(n+ 1)t
γ1 2−nC1δ
2
(38)
where ρTV is total variation distance, P (k(t)) is P ’s restriction to sequences of
length k(t), n = bt/k(t)c − 1, γ1 = (hP + /2)/(hP + ) and C1 is a positive
constant specific to P (the exact value of which is not important).
The log-likelihood per observation of a Markov chain θ ∈ Θk is
t−1 log fθ(xt1) = t
−1 log fθ(xk1) +
∑
w∈Ξk
∑
a∈Ξ
P̂
(k+1)
t (wa) log fθ(a|w)
where fθ(a|w) is of course the probability, according to θ, of producing a after
seeing w. By asymptotic equipartition, this is converging a.s. to its expected
value, −hP − h(θ).
Let z(θ) = maxw,a |log fθ(a|w)|. If z(θ) ≤ z0 and ρTV (P̂ (k+1)t , P (k+1)) ≤
δ, then t−1 log fθ(xt1) is within z0δ of −hP − h(θ). Meanwhile, t−1 log p(xt1) is
converging a.s. to −hP , and again [60]
P (|t−1 log p(Xt1)− hP | > δ) ≤ q(t, δ)2−tC2δ (39)
for some C2 > 0 and sub-exponential q(t, δ). (The details are unilluminating in
the present context and thus skipped.)
Define G(t, z0) as the set of all Markov models whose order is less than or
equal to k(t) − 1 and whose log transition probabilities do not exceed z0, in
symbols
G(t, z0) = {θ : z(θ) ≤ z0} ∩
k(t)−1⋃
j=1
Θj

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Combining the deviation-probability bounds 38 and 39, for all θ ∈ G(t, z0)
P
(∣∣∣∣ logRt(θ)t − h(θ)
∣∣∣∣ > δ) ≤ log th+ 2(n+ 1)tγ12−nC1δ24z0 + q(t, δ)2− tC2δ2 (40)
These probabilities are clearly summable as t → ∞, so by the Borel-Cantelli
lemma, we have uniform almost-sure convergence of t−1 logRt(θ) to −h(θ) for
all θ ∈ G(t, z0).
The sets G(t, z0) eventually expand to include Markov models of arbitrarily
high order, but maintain a constant bound on the transition probabilities. To
relax this, let zt be an increasing function of t, z(t)→∞, subject to zt ≤ C3tγ2
for positive γ2 < γ1. Then the deviation probabilities remain summable, and
for each t, the convergence of t−1 logRt(θ) is still uniform on G(t, zt). Set Gt =
G(t, zt), and turn to verifying the remaining assumptions.
Start with Assumption 5; take its items in reverse order. So far, the only
restriction on the prior Π0 has been that its support should be the whole of
Θ, and that it should have the “Kullback-Leibler rate property”, giving posi-
tive weight to every set N = {θ : d(θ) < }. This, together with the fact that
limtGt = Θ, means that h(Gt) → h(Θ), which is item (3) of the assump-
tion. The same argument also delivers Assumption 7. Item (2), uniform conver-
gence on each Gt, is true by construction. Finally (for this assumption), since
h(Θ) = 0, any β > 0 will do, and there are certainly probability measures where
Π0(Gct) ≤ α exp {−βt} for some α, β > 0. So, Assumption 5 is satisfied.
Only Assumption 6 remains. Since Assumptions 1–3 have already been checked,
we can apply Eq. 18 from the proof of Lemma 6 and see that, for each fixed G
from the sequence of Gt, for any  > 0, for all sufficiently large t,
t−1 log Π0 (GRt) ≤ −h(G) + + t−1 log Π0(G) a.s.
This shows that τ(Gt, δ) is almost surely finite for all t and δ, but still leaves
open the question of whether for every δ and all sufficiently large t, t ≥ τ(Gt, δ)
(a.s.). Reformulating a little, the desideratum is that for each δ, with probability
1, t < τ(Gt, δ) only finitely often. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma, this will happen
if
∑
t P (τ(Gt, δ) > t) ≤ ∞. However, if τ(Gt, δ) > t, it must be equal to some
particular n > t, so there is a union bound:
∑
t
P (τ(Gt, δ) > t) ≤
∑
t
∞∑
n=t+1
P
(
log Π0 (GtRn)
n
> δ − h(Gt)
)
(41)
From the proof of Lemma 6 (specifically from Eqs. 15, 16 and 17), we can see that
by making t large enough, the only way to have the event n−1 log Π0 (GtRn) >
δ − h(Gt) is to have
∣∣n−1 logRn(θ)− h(θ)∣∣ > δ/2 everywhere on a positive-
measure subset of Gt. But we know from Eq. 40 not only that the inner sum
can be made arbitrarily small by taking t sufficiently large, but that the whole
double sum is finite. So τ(Gt, δ) > t only finitely often (a.s.).
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